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Good faith protections and public sector
liability
Iain Field*
This article examines the role that statutory good faith protections play in
shaping the formal limits of public sector liability and in managing the
boundaries between private and public interests. The article demonstrates
that a sophisticated body of law now exists, which guides lawmakers in the
drafting and construction of specific good faith protections. It also considers
the practical consequences of the interpretive principles that courts apply to
good faith protections for the economic interests of public servants and the
Crown, and illustrates the limits that these principles might place on the
scope of certain forms of good faith protection.
I Introduction and outline
In tort law, public sector bodies and employees might be sued for conduct that
causes private entities to suffer property damage, personal injury or economic
loss. Depending on the cause of action in which such a claim is framed,
liability might be constrained by statute if the defendant acted in ‘good faith’
(or ‘bona fide’ ‘honestly’, ‘without malice’, and so forth). Such provisions are
described here a ‘good faith protections’.1 Good faith protections might
safeguard the economic interests of: (1) public sector bodies and employees,
by defeating the plaintiff’s cause of action entirely; or (2) public sector
employees alone, by limiting or defeating their personal liability or
susceptibility to suit and directing the plaintiff’s loss to the relevant public
body (the employer).2
This article represents one outcome of a broader inquiry by the author into
the nature and function of good faith (and other similar) protections in tort
law.3 The purpose of the article is to demonstrate the (hitherto
underappreciated) importance of good faith protections to the overall schema
of public sector liability, and to expose certain statutory mechanisms (or
drafting techniques) that legislatures routinely adopt to manage the impact of
good faith protections upon that schema. Neither the existence nor the
operation of these mechanisms is self-evident. Yet, by adopting one or more
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University. Sincerest thanks are due to Joachim
Dietrich, who contributed greatly to the development of this article, and to the anonymous
reviewer, whose thoughtful comments resulted in substantive changes. I am also grateful to
the Singapore Academy of Law and the Singapore Management University, and in particular
Lee Pey Woan, Carolyn Lim and Tan Xiao Wen. This article is a modifie version of ‘Good
Faith Protections and Public Sector Liability’ (paper presented at Protecting Business and
Economic Interests: Contemporary Issues in Tort Law, Singapore, 18–19 August 2016).
1 The narrower term ‘defences’ is avoided here, as it is debatable whether all of the provisions
examined in this article are properly define as such. This point is considered further in Part
II below.
2 For the purposes of this article both scenarios are treated as instances of ‘public sector
liability’.
3 See, in particular, I Field, ‘Good Faith Defences in Tort Law’ (2016) 38 SLR 147.
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of these mechanisms, parliament is able both to limit the range of torts to
which protection extends, and to determine whether loss is borne by
individual public servants, the Crown, or both. It follows that a clear
appreciation of these mechanisms is essential to a comprehensive
understanding of public sector liability in tort law, and may be of some
practical importance to public servants, public service unions, and
parliamentary draftspersons in particular.
The article is structured as follows: Part II define the term ‘protection’ and
explains why that term is adopted instead of the (perhaps more obvious term)
‘defences’; Part III outlines the range of circumstances in which good faith
might bear upon public sector liability in tort law, and distinguishes between
good faith protections and other rules in tort law that are sensitive to bona
fide and mala fides Part IV explains the meaning of good faith in tort law and
illustrates the essential relationship between good faith and inculpatory fault
criteria (negligence, intention and so forth); Part V examines the mechanisms
adopted by the drafters of good faith protections to manage loss-shifting
within the public sector — that is, between public servants and the Crown —
and demonstrates that some of these mechanisms operate by displacing
well-established rules of vicarious liability; and Part VI explains how subtle
variations in the legislature’s choice of language can alter significantl the
circumstances in which a good faith protection is effective — that is, the torts
to which protection extends. The article also considers, at various stages, what
parliament’s drafting choices might reveal about its intentions vis-a`-vis a
specifi class of public sector defendant.
II What is a ‘protection’?
The statutory provisions with which this article is concerned are described
here as ‘protections’. This term is adopted in order to avoid, insofar as
possible, any taxonomical confusion or complaint that might arise if the term
‘defences’ were adopted. As others have noted, it is debatable whether there
is any such thing as a ‘defence’ in tort law, as it may be impossible to draw
a logical distinction between rules of liability (the elements of a tort) on the
one hand, and ‘exceptions’ to those rules (defences) on the other.4 Even if a
logical distinction can be drawn, various definition of the term defences may
be posited, which definition may or may not embrace all of the provisions
with which this article is concerned. Particular difficulties arise, for example,
if one takes the view that a provision must defeat all possible remedies to
qualify as a defence. This is because some (perhaps most) statutory good faith
provisions merely defeat a plaintiff’s action in damages — they do not prevent
a court from awarding injunctive relief or, perhaps, some other discretionary
remedy.5 Difficulties might also arise if one takes the (conventional) view that
4 Compare, in particular, G Williams, ‘The Logic of Exceptions’ (1988) 47 CLJ 261 at 277;
J Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences, Hart Publishing, 2013, pp 2–3; L D d’Almeida, ‘Definin
“Defences”’ in Defences in Tort, A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (Eds), Hart,
2015, pp 35, 52.
5 See, eg, Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 26C.
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a provision must place the burden of proof on the defendant to qualify as a
defence,6 since there is no reason to suppose that all good faith protections
operate in this way.7
The resolution of these issues may be important in certain contexts,8 but
they have no bearing on the current analysis. That being so, the term
‘protection’ is employed here to encompass any statutory rule that defeats
liability in tort law, (1) regardless of whether that rule creates an exception to
liability, or merely defeats an element of the tort in which the plaintiff sues;
(2) regardless of whether that rule defeats all possible remedies; and
(3) regardless of whether that rule places the onus of proof on the plaintiff or
the defendant. The term ‘defence’ is nevertheless used to describe specifi
exculpatory rules conventionally labelled as such, including (in particular) the
defence of statutory authority, on which more in Part III.
One fina point to note at this stage is that good faith protections are
sometimes described as ‘immunities’.9 It is debatable whether this is
appropriate. As explained further in Part IV, good faith denotes a person’s
motives for acting, whereas most (perhaps all) immunities protect a particular
group of defendants from liability irrespective of the defendant’s motives.10
The mere fact that good faith protections are sometimes described as
immunities does not matter unduly for present purposes, provided that the
definin qualificatio to those protections — the presence of good faith — is
not ignored. What does matter, though, is that parliament and the courts would
appear to accept that good faith protections are ‘immunities’ for the purposes
of the so-called ‘transferred immunity’ rule — that is, the rule that ‘a person
who is vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of another is protected by any
immunity that is available to the actual wrongdoer’.11 Applying this rule, a
good faith protection granted to a class of public servant extends — absent
some contrary legislative indication — to the public body that employs those
public servants. The transferred immunity rule, and the drafting techniques
that parliament might adopt to circumvent that rule, are considered further in
6 E Descheemaeker, ‘Tort Law Defences: A Defence of Conventionalism’ (2014) 77 MLR 493
at 499. Compare Goudkamp, above n 4, p 6.
7 See, eg, the conflictin interpretations afforded in this respect to s 29(1) of the State Bank
of South Australia Act 1983 (SA) (repealed), in South Australia v Barrett SASC, Perry J,
SCGRG-94-456, 8 July 1994, unreported, BC9400743 on the one hand, and in Barrett v
South Australia (1994) 63 SASR 208 at 209 per Bollen J, at 210 per Millhouse J, at 221 per
Duggan J on the other.
8 These issues will be considered at length in a future enquiry by the author.
9 See, eg, Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) s 165; Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) s 218;
Bankstown City Council v Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 660;; 221 ALR 1;
[2005] HCA 46; BC200506539 at [47] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ;
Attrill v Richmond River Shire Council (1996) Aust Torts Reports 81-370; BC9501777 at
[5], [18] per Kirby P; J Goudkamp, ‘Statutes and Tort Defences’ in Tort Law and the
Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change, J Steele and T T
Arvind, Hart, 2013, pp 45–6.
10 See, eg, Goudkamp, above n 4, p 142; P Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, Hart,
2002, pp 89–90.
11 Commonwealth v Griffıths (2007) 70 NSWLR 268; 245 ALR 172; [2007] NSWCA 370;
BC200710981 at [115] per Beazley JA; citing Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage
Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 at 57–8 per Fullagar J; BC5700280; Parker v
Commonwealth (1965) 112 CLR 295 at 301, 303 per Windeyer J; BC6500140.
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Part VC. To avoid unnecessary complexity, good faith protections are
described as immunities in that section.
III The occurrence of good (and bad) faith in tort law
In contrast to other world legal systems, no common-law jurisdiction
embraces an overarching ‘doctrine of good faith’.12 However, the language of
good faith is hardly foreign to the ears of common-law lawyers. As Finn J
explains, ‘the term “good faith” (or its now less fashionable Latin equivalent
“bona fide” is a protean one having longstanding usage in a variety of
statutory and, for that matter, common law contexts’.13 Good faith and bad
faith are perhaps less readily associated with tort law than they are with other
substantive legal departments,14 but they do play a role.15 It is now generally
accepted, for example, that bad faith (or malice) must be proved to establish
liability in the torts of misfeasance in public office16 and malicious
prosecution.17
It is through statute, however, that the concept of good faith makes its most
significan contribution to tort law (in most common law jurisdictions).18
Good faith might bear upon tortious liability in at least two overlapping
statutory contexts. First, it might form an express or implied precondition to
a defence of statutory authority and a condition upon the exercise of certain
statutory powers. In CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,
for example, Gageler J held it to be an ‘implied condition’ of powers conferred
on Australian maritime officers by the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) that
12 See, eg, E McKendrick, ‘Good Faith: A Matter of Principle?’ in Good Faith in Contract and
Property Law, A D M Forte (Ed), Hart, 1999, p 40; J Beatson and D Friedman, ‘From
“Classical” to Modern Law’ in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, J Beatson and D
Friedman (Ed), Clarendon Press, 1995, p 15.
13 Secretary, Department of Education, Employment, Training & Youth Affairs v Prince (1997)
50 ALD 186 at 188; 152 ALR 127 at 130; BC9707562.
14 See, eg, the lengthy discussion of good faith as it is implied in a variety of contracts in N
Sneddon, R Bigwood and E Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract, 10th
Australian ed, LexisNexis, 2012, pp 464–79.
15 It has also been suggested that a duty of care in tort law to act in good faith will arise in
certain special relationships (see, eg, P Handford, ‘Victoria Puts No Faith In Good Faith
Tort’ (1996) 4 TLR 21), and an implied licence to enter upon land is ordinarily subject to the
requirement that the entrance be for ‘legitimate’ or ‘bona fide reasons (see, eg, Lincoln Hunt
Australia v Willisee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457 at 460 per Young J). In some states in the United
States, private persons motivated by malice may also be liable in tort pursuant to the
so-called ‘prima facie tort doctrine’. See, eg, Beardsley v Kilmar, 236 NY 80 (1923), 89–90
(Holmes J); United States for Use and Benefit of Evergreen Pipeline Construction Co v
Merritt Meridian Construction Corp (1996) 95 F 3d 153 at 161.
16 Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3)
[2003] 2 AC 1 at 191 per Lord Steyn, at 229–30 per Lord Hobhouse, at 235 per Lord Millet,
at 267 per Lord Hutton); Garrett v Attorney-General [1997] 2 NZLR 332 at 344 per
Blanchard J; Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse [2003] 3 SCR 263 at 274 per Iacobucci J;
Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 at 357; 129 ALR 1 at 26 per Brennan J;
BC9506418. See also J Murphy, ‘Misfeasance in a Public Office: A Tort Law Misfit? (2012)
32 OJLS 51 at 51.
17 A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 233 ALR 584; [2007] HCA 10; BC200701675
at [53], [117] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Heydon and Crennan JJ, at [187] per
Callinan J.
18 The position in the United States is slightly different, as some states afford public officials
a general ‘qualifie [good faith] immunity’ at common law.
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‘the maritime officer must act in good faith’.19 The maritime officers in
question detained the plaintiff, a Tamil refugee, on board a Commonwealth
vessel for a period exceeding three weeks before taking him to the Cocos
(Keeling) Islands. Since there was no suggestion that the maritime officers had
exercised their powers other than in good faith, and had in all other respects
acted reasonably and within their powers, the detention of the plaintiff was
authorised by the Act and the officers were not liable for false imprisonment.20
The second statutory context in which good faith might bear upon liability
in tort law — and the context with which this article is principally concerned
— is by providing defendants with an express protection that defeats, limits or
shifts liability or susceptibility to suit if certain acts or omissions are done in
good faith (a good faith protection).21 Good faith in this context does not
operate as a precondition to a defence of statutory authority, but rather forms
the basis of a discrete and targeted protection in circumstances where a
defendant’s conduct is not authorised by statute, by virtue of some error in
fact, law, the manner in which an actual or purported statutory function is
performed, or the manner in which a statutory purpose is pursued.22
Legislatures routinely afford good faith protections to numerous classes of
public servant, including police officers,23 firepersons 24 government
19 [2015] 255 CLR 514; 143 ALD 443; [2015] HCA 1; BC201500135 at [360] per Gageler J.
See also [200] per Crennan J. The power to ‘take and detain’ a person under that Act is also
subject to the express requirement that the maritime officer ‘reasonably suspects’ that the
person was on a vessel or aircraft when it was detained (Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) s
72(b)), and the implied limitation that the power be exercised within a ‘reasonable time’: at
[200] per Crennan J, citing Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533 at 573–4 per
Dixon J, at 590 per Williams J; BC4900640.
20 CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, ibid, at [54] per French CJ, at
[229] per Crennan J, at [392]–[393] per Gageler J, at [513] per Keane J. Hayne and Bell JJ
dissented (at [164]), as did Kiefel J (at [326]), although not on the issue of good faith.
21 Good faith is now ordinarily — if not invariably — an express term of protective provisions.
However, good faith has also been implied when protective provisions have been silent on
the point. See, eg, Dixon J’s treatment of the National Security Act 1939 (Cth) s 13 in Little
v Commonwealth (1947) 75 CLR 94 at 108; BC4700330.
22 Ibid, at 112 per Dixon J. Good faith protections are therefore exceptions to the ‘the general
rule that, if conduct is presumptively unlawful, a good motive will not exonerate the
defendant’: Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England
(No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 at 190 per Lord Steyn, citing P H Winfield J A Jolowicz, and W V
H Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 15th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 1998, p 55.
23 In Australia, see, eg: Police Act 1990 (NSW) s 213; Police Administration Act (NT) ss 116G
and 148B; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 38, 122 and 787; Police Act
1998 (SA) s 65; Police Service Act 2003 (Tas) s 84; Police Act 1892 (WA) s 137. In New
Zealand, see, eg, International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 (NZ) s 16; Search
and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) s 165. In the United Kingdom, see, eg, Police Reform and
Social Responsibility Act 2011 Sch 1, s 14; Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
(UK) s 90.
24 In Australia, see, eg, Fire Brigades Act 1989 (NSW) s 78; Fire and Emergency Act (NT)
s 47; Fire and Emergency Services Act 1990 (Qld) s 153B-C; Fire Service Act 1979 (Tas)
s 121; Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (Vic) s 18A; Fire and Emergency Services Act 1998
(WA) s 37. In Canada, see, eg, Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act 1992, SC 1992, c 34,
s 20; Emergency 911 Act, RSNB 2011, c 146, s 8; Firefighters Protection Act, SNL 1996,
c F-11.1, s 3; Fire Protection and Prevention Act, SO 1997, c 4, s 74(1). In New Zealand,
see, eg, Fire Services Act 1975 (NZ) s 43; Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977 (NZ) s 56. In
214 (2016) 23 Torts Law Journal
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auditors,25 health care practitioners and researchers,26 environmental or public
health officers,27 and various other local and national government
employees.28 A long-standing and demonstrative example of a good faith
protection is provided by s 78 of the Fire Brigades Act 1989 (NSW):
A matter or thing done, or omitted to be done, by the Minister, the Commissioner,
any member of staff of Fire and Rescue NSW, any member of a fir brigade, any
member of a community fir unit or any person acting under the authority of the
Commissioner does not, if the matter or thing was done, or omitted to be done, in
good faith for the purposes of executing this or any other Act, subject such a person
personally, or the Crown, to any action, liability, claim or demand.
Quite aside from the effect that good faith protections have upon the formal
boundaries of public sector liability (and tort law generally), their widespread
availability is likely to influenc (and to have influenced the course of
tort-law litigation, by discouraging plaintiffs from suing certain defendants at
the expense of others. Suppose, for example, that a motorist (P) suffers injuries
that are, prima facie, jointly and severally attributable to (1) the negligent
driving of a police officer in pursuit of a suspect (D1), and (2) the negligent
driving of another road user (D2). If D1 is the beneficiar of a good faith
protection, and that protection also extends to the Crown, P might choose to
sue D2 alone and to ignore entirely D1’s negligence on the basis that good
faith is simply too difficult to disprove (or too easy for D1 to prove).29 After
all, it makes no financia difference to P whether damages are paid by D1, D2,
or both. In this way, the provision of good faith protections to certain classes
of defendant might even affect the development of substantive legal
principles, by limiting the opportunities for courts to shape the legal liabilities
of those groups, while increasing the opportunities for courts to shape the
liabilities of other groups.
If plaintiff litigation strategy is indeed influence in this way, then by
Singapore, see Fire Safety Act (Singapore, cap 109A, 2000 rev ed) s 59(3). In the United
Kingdom, see, eg, Combined Fire Authorities (Protection from Personal Liability (Wales)
Order 1997 (UK) s 3.
25 See, eg: Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) s 66; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 184; Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 (UK) Sch 8, s 4(3).
26 In Australia see, eg, Mental Health Act 2015 (ACT) s 265; Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW)
s 191; Mental Health and Related Services Act (NT) s 164; Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld)
s 536; Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) s 218; Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) s 77; Mental
Health Act 2014 (WA) s 583. In Canada, see, eg, Human Tissue Gift Act, RSBC 1996, c 211,
s 9; Human Tissue Gift Act, RSS 1978, c H-15, s 10. In New Zealand, see, eg, Land
Transport Act 1998 (NZ) s 18. In Singapore, see, eg, Human Cloning and Other Prohibited
Practices Act (Cap 131b, rev ed 2004) s 15.
27 See, eg, Control of Vectors and Pesticides Act (Singapore, Cap 59, 2002 rev ed) s 54;
Hazardous Waste (Control of Export, Import And Transit) Act (Singapore, Cap 122A, 1998
re ed) s 43.
28 In Australia, see, eg, Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) s 733; Public Service Act 2008
(Qld) s 26C; Local Government Act 1995 (WA) s 9.56. In Singapore, see, eg, Public
Transport Council Act (Singapore, Cap 259B, 2012 rev ed) s 6; National Parks Board Act
(Cap 198A, 1996 rev ed) s 11. In the United Kingdom, see, eg, Public Health Act 1875 (UK)
c 55, s 265.
29 Negligent driving may or may not actually be within the scope of the protection afforded to
D1, depending on the legislature’s choice of language, on which more in Part VI. However,
if P can receive full compensation from D2 without having to argue this point, he may be
well advised to do so.
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affording good faith protections to certain groups and not to others, parliament
is able to effectively divert economic risk from the public sector to the private
sector in certain scenarios. Alternatively, parliament might seek to redistribute
economic risk within the public sector, by limiting or defeating the personal
liability of public servants, or their susceptibility to suit, and allocating that
risk to the Crown (on which more in Part V).
In making these observations, this article does not mean to entertain the
‘extravagant delusion that every aspect of every rule in the encyclopaedia of
tort law is a product of a conscious and fully-informed design process’.30
Indeed, Bagshaw is surely correct that:
choices have sometimes been made by lawmakers who were apparently unaware of
the significanc of their selection between options, and may even have been unaware
of the range of options that were available (in the sense that they made no mention
of the fact that other options were utilised elsewhere in the English law of torts).31
However, parliament could hardly be blind to the obvious and direct economic
consequences of affording a good faith protection to a certain class of public
sector defendant, even if those consequences are not their primary purpose for
affording that protection.32
IV The meaning and function of good faith in tort law
The precise meaning (or meanings) of good faith in tort law is analysed at
length elsewhere,33 and little would be gained by restating the minutia of that
analysis here. Suffice it to state for present purposes that, in tort law, good faith
usually describes one or more of a defendant’s motives (or reasons) for acting
— a subjective mind state — even though those motives may be insufficient
to render his or her conduct reasonable. Good faith is therefore typically
concerned with the ends that a defendant seeks to achieve, as opposed to the
means by which he or she seeks to achieve those ends. However, and crucially,
even if good faith might be interpreted as imposing an objective standard in
certain instances,34 that standard cannot be conflate with objective
reasonableness (or the absence of negligence).35 This must be so because,
were it otherwise, good faith would be rendered redundant as a concept,
contrary to well-established principles of statutory construction.36
30 R Bagshaw, ‘Balancing Defences’ in Defences in Tort, A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F
Wilmot-Smith (Eds), Hart, 2015, pp 87, 88.
31 Ibid.
32 See below Part VA.
33 See Field, above n 3, at 149–52.
34 See, eg, Siano v Helvering (1936) 13 F Supp 776; Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v
Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) 44 FCR 290 at 298, 299–300; 116 ALR 460 at 468, 469;
BC9304964; Barrett v South Australia (1994) 63 SASR 208 at 209 per Bollen J.
35 It follows that statutory good faith protections and the protection of statutory authority may
be further distinguished on the basis that, whereas statutory authority only provides an
answer to wrongdoing if an agent also acted reasonably in the performance of a function
authorised by statute (Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001 at 1011; [1981] 1 All
ER 353 at 355 per Lord Wilberforce, statutory good faith protections may provide an answer
to wrongdoing even if a defendant acted unreasonably in the circumstances, provided that he
or she acted within reason.
36 R v Berchet (1688) 1 Show KB 106; 89 ER 480, quoted in Commonwealth v Baume (1905)
216 (2016) 23 Torts Law Journal
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If this definitio of good faith is accepted, it follows that a good faith
protection might be available to a defendant whose motives for acting are
good, even though he or she satisfie the fault criterion of the tort in which the
plaintiff sues.37 Suppose, for example, that a public health officer (D) were to
enter a vessel docked in Singapore without the consent of its owner (P) in
order to spray that vessel with a pesticide (conduct that would otherwise
constitute trespass) in accordance with ss 21(2) and 35 of the Control of
Vectors and Pesticides Act (Singapore, Cap 59, 2002 rev ed) (the CVP Act).38
Suppose, further, that D is motivated to carry out that spraying by a desire to
fulfi her statutory functions and to prevent the escape of an insect-born
disease, but that she carries out that spraying negligently, causing physical
damage to P’s vessel. If P were to commence an action in trespass or
negligence against D, she might seek the protection of s 54 of the CVP Act,
which provides as follows:
No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Director-General or
authorised officer or any other person acting under the direction of the
Director-General for anything which is in good faith done in the execution or
purported execution of this Act.
Since D’s reasons for engaging in the spraying (her ends) are likely to satisfy
the definitio of good faith, s 54 is likely to protect her from suit — in both
trespass and negligence — notwithstanding that the manner in which she
sought to achieve those ends (her means) was negligent.39
Whether a good faith protection is effective, and the range of torts to which
it might provide an answer, will nevertheless depend upon the nature of the
fault criterion comprised within the plaintiff’s cause of action. Thus, if a public
officer were to satisfy the fault element of the tort of misfeasance in public
office, by acting in bad faith in the performance of his or her functions so as
to injure a member of the public, he could not at the same time claim to have
acted in good faith to that end.40 Similarly, a public officer who was reckless
in the performance of his or her functions could not claim to have acted in
good faith (since a person who acts recklessly does not act for any legitimate
purpose).41 For this reason, good faith is also unlikely to provide an answer to
2 CLR 405 at 414 Griffith CJ; BC0500058; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting
Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; 153 ALR 490; [1998] HCA 28; BC9801389 at [71] per
McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ.
37 This observation, and those that follow, is also expounded at length elsewhere. See Field,
above n 3, at 161–78.
38 To the author’s knowledge these provisions have not received any judicial analysis, thus it
remains a matter of interpretation whether they do in fact authorise what would otherwise
constitute trespass. This point is considered in greater length in Part VIA below. For the
purposes of this hypothetical example, though, it is assumed that these provisions do
authorise otherwise trespassory conduct.
39 While there does not appear to be any direct Singaporean on this point, or indeed on the
operation of good faith protections generally, it seems highly likely that the Singaporean
courts would adopt the same interpretive principles as have courts in the United Kingdom
and Australia, on which more below.
40 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 at 357; 129 ALR 1 at 26–7; BC9506418.
See also Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329; 157 ALR 491; [1998] HCA 64; BC9805142
at [42] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ.
41 Field, above n 3, at 162, 167–8.
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the tort of deceit, even if the representor is merely reckless as to the truth of
his or her representation (as opposed to knowingly deceitful).42
It is possible that good faith might provide an answer to torts that require
proof of intention as to outcome, since a defendant might intend one outcome
(such as interfering with contractual relations) yet be motivated to act for a
good reason (such as ensuring the supply of essential goods and services).43
It is far more common, however, for good faith to be invoked as an answer to
claims in trespass (whether to person or property) or negligence — as in the
case of our public health officer, above. Trespass and negligence are
unconcerned with a defendant’s reasons for acting, hence conduct that satisfie
the definitiona elements of these causes of action is more likely to be justifie
(or excused)44 by a good reason than is conduct that is intended to cause harm.
For the sake of simplicity, therefore, the remainder of this article focusses
exclusively on good faith as an answer to trespass and negligence. It is
nevertheless crucial to appreciate that not all good faith protections are
capable of defeating liability in both trespass and negligence. This is because
the choice of legislative language adopted might restrict the scope of a good
protection to one or other of these bases of liability, on which more in Part VI.
V Good faith, vicarious liability, and the allocation of
loss within the public sector
A Public and private interests
Good faith (and other similar) protections might serve numerous purposes,
some of which might go beyond the protection of economic interests.45 But
whatever these purposes might be, all good faith protections also give effect
— whether expressly or impliedly — to the strong public interest in freeing
certain public servants from ‘technical difficulties in conducting their defence
[and] from the heavy costs which must follow a verdict against them’.46 This
public interest must, of course, be balanced against the private interests
42 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 at 374; Tresize v National Australia Bank Ltd (2005)
220 ALR 706; [2005] FCA 1095; BC200505749 at [38]. But see Lord Toulson’s statement
in Hayward v Zurich Insurance Company Plc [2016] All ER (D) 138 (Jul); [2016] 3 WLR
637; [2016] UKSC 48 [58]: ‘it must be shown that the defendant dishonestly made a
material false representation which was intended to, and did, induce the representee to act to
its detriment’. If this is correct, which seems doubtful, liability in deceit cannot be founded
on recklessness, since a person must (presumably) actually know information to be wrong
if he or she intends another to rely upon it to their detriment.
43 Field, above n 3, at 167.
44 It is debatable whether a tort law defendant may be ‘excused’ and, if so, what distinction (if
any) might be drawn between excuses and justifications See, eg, A Dyson, J Goudkamp and
F Wilmot-Smith, ‘Central Issues in the Law of Tort Defences’ in Dyson et al, above n 30,
pp 19, 22. However, this debate need not be explored here.
45 For example, good faith protections might protect public interests in the administration of
justice by limiting the number of law suits. They might also seek to encourage officers to
pursue their functions fearlessly, or to ‘innovate and improve service delivery without the
concern of being sued and the accompanying financia risk’. (Explanatory Notes, Public
Service and Other Legislation (Civil Liability) Amendment Bill 2013 (Qld).) The author is
grateful to the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
46 Thomas v Stephenson (1853) ER 709 at 712 per Campbell LJ.
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affected by the protection afforded.47 In some instances, parliament might
determine that the public interest in releasing both the Crown and its
employees from prospective liability is sufficiently strong to extinguish
private interests entirely (provided the public servant acted in good faith). In
other instances, however, parliament might seek to protect private interests,
while at the same time freeing public servants from economic risks, by
allocating the public servant’s obligation to pay damages to the Crown. This
allocation may be achieved by (1) shifting liability for a public servant’s
wrong entirely to the Crown (a liability-shifting protection); (2) defeating the
personal liability of the public servant while preserving the vicarious liability
of the Crown (a liability-saving protection); or (3) indemnifying a public
servant ‘who is sued for tortious conduct arising out of his or her
employment’48 (an indemnity).49 In all instances, the protection afforded may
require that the public servant acted in good faith, reasonably, with utmost
care, or in accordance with any other exculpatory criterion that parliament
sees fit
The manner in which parliament chooses to protect public servants may be
important because, applying traditional canons of statutory construction,
courts are more likely to afford a liberal interpretation to provisions that
protect private rights or interests (regardless of the particular loss-allocating
mechanism employed) than they are to protections that defeat or curtail
private rights or interests.50 It might be, therefore, that by affording public
servants a degree of protection at the Crown’s expense, parliament provides
those public servants with a more robust protection than it would if it were to
extend that protection to the Crown as well.
Statutory good faith indemnities operate by shifting loss from one party
(such as a public officer) to another party (such as the Crown) without
transferring liability for the firs party’s wrong. For example, s 43 of the Local
Government Act 2002 (NZ) provides as follows:
(1) A member of a local authority is indemnifie by that local authority
for—
(a) costs and damages for any civil liability arising from any action brought by
a third party if the member was acting in good faith and in pursuance (or
intended pursuance) of the responsibilities or powers of the local authority
47 Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin (1961) 109 CLR 105 at 116 per Kitto J;
BC6100550.
48 Queensland Law Reform Commission, Vicarious Liability, Report No 56, 2001, p 84 n 390.
See, eg, Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld) s 39;
49 Whether the firs and third of these protections are properly classifie as ‘defences’ is a
question that will be considered at length in a future enquiry by the author.
50 See, eg, Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] 1 AC 736 at 764–5; [1956] 1 All
ER 855 at 868 per Lord Smith; Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249 at 256 per Barwick
CJ; BC6900610; Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446 at 463–4; [1980] 2 All ER 753 at 763
per Lord Scarman; Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054 at 1065 per Lord
Brown-Wilkinson; Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1 at 18; 93 ALR 207 at 215
per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; BC9002906; Coco v R
(1994) 179 CLR 427 at 436–8; 120 ALR 415 at 418–20 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron
and McHugh JJ; BC9404609; Kartinyeryi v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337; 152 ALR
540; [1998] HCA 22; BC9800961 at [89] per Gummow and Hayne JJ.
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Since good faith indemnities such as s 43 do not defeat liability in any sense,
they are in principle entirely unconnected to — and say nothing about — the
law of vicarious liability. In contrast, liability-shifting protections and
liability-saving protections operate by circumventing or displacing certain
common law rules that would otherwise prevent the imposition of vicarious
liability on the Crown. The purpose of the remainder of this part is to explain
those rules, to demonstrate the effect that certain good faith protections might
have upon them, and to reveal what the operation or exclusion of those rules
might mean for public servants in certain instances.
B Liability-shifting protections and the ‘independent duty’
rule
At common law, when a public officer ‘is executing an independent duty
which the law casts upon him, the Crown is not liable for the wrongful acts
he may commit in the course of his execution’ (the independent duty rule).51
This rule appears to have developed primarily as a means of distancing the
Crown from the tortious acts of police officers.52 However, it has also been
applied in Australia in the context of other public officers, including a ship’s
pilot,53 a Crown prosecutor,54 a legal aid officer,55 a tax commissioner,56 a
magistrate,57 a prison guard58 and a customs officer.59
The independent duty rule is much maligned, for two reasons in particular.
First, its policy rationale is far from clear. Since claims against public officers
rarely involve any challenge to policy-level decision-making, there is no
obvious reason why a government employer ought to be treated differently in
such circumstances to a private employer,60 or why the ordinary principles of
vicarious liability ought not to apply.61 Second, the independent duty rule
originates in the now generally disfavoured ‘master’s tort’ theory of vicarious
51 Field v Nott (1939) 62 CLR 660 at 675 per Dixon J; BC3990106; applying Enever v R
(1906) 3 CLR 969; BC0600036. See also Tobin v R (1864) 143 ER 1148; Stanbury v Exeter
Corporation (1905) 2 KB 838; Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1; 174 ALR 97;
[2000] FCA 1084; BC200004514.
52 See, eg, Enever v R, ibid, Fisher v Oldham Corporation [1930] 2 KB 364; Attorney-General
(NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co (1952) 85 CLR 237; BC5200100; Shulze v R (1974) 47 DLR
(3d) 131; Irvin v Whitrod [1978] Qd R 27; Griffıths v Haines [1984] 3 NSWLR 653.
53 Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 626; 66
ALR 29; BC8601438 (Oceanic Crest).
54 Grimwade v Victoria (1997) 90 A Crim R 526; Aust Torts Reports 81-422; BC9700017.
55 Field v Nott (1939) 62 CLR 660; BC3990106.
56 Carpenter’s Investment Trading Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 175; 5
AITR 538.
57 Thompson v Williams (1914) 32 WN (NSW) 27.
58 Thorne v Western Australia [1964] WAR 147.
59 Baume v Commonwealth (1906) 4 CLR 97; BC0600026.
60 It has been suggested that the independent duty rule might, in fact, protect private
companies: Oceanic Crest (1986) 160 CLR 626 at 648; 66 ALR 29 at 41 per Wilson J;
BC8601438. However, this view does not appear to have gained general acceptance.
61 It has been argued that independent duties are vested in public officers — and that the
independent duty rule is therefore necessary — because the Crown lacks the capacity to
control the exercise of those duties: ibid, at CLR 638; ALR 34 per Dawson J. However,
Deane J is surely correct that this view insists ‘upon a degree of control as a prerequisite of
an employer’s vicarious liability in tort which is simply inconsistent with contemporary
law’: at CLR 679; ALR 62.
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liability62 — that is to say, the theory that a master ‘is to answer for the
[servant’s] act as it if it were his own’.63 Accepting this theory, so the
argument goes, if parliament chooses to vest a duty directly in a public officer,
it cannot intend the Crown to answer in its own right for acts done in the
furtherance of that duty. Some judges have even suggested that the
relationship between public officers and the Crown cannot, in such
circumstances, be characterised as one of master-servant.64 In contrast, if
vicarious liability is said to arise for a breach of duty ‘resting on another and
broken by another’65 — the ‘servant’s tort’ theory — then the mere fact that
a duty is, in terms, cast upon a public officer in his or her personal capacity
says nothing about whether parliament intended the Crown to be strictly liable
for a breach of that duty, or whether the Crown and that public officer are
properly to be regarded as falling within a master-servant relationship.
Liability-shifting protections circumvent the independent duty rule by
imposing strict (vicarious) liability upon the Crown for losses arising out of
duties vested in, and broken by, public servants. Liability-shifting protections
might therefore be seen as endorsing the servant’s tort theory of vicarious
liability, and as rationalising the liability of the Crown with the vicarious
liability imposed upon private employers in similar circumstances. An
example of a liability-shifting protection that circumvents the independent
duty rule can be seen in s 84 of the Police Service Act 2003 (Tas):
A police officer does not incur any personal liability for any act or omission done or
made in good faith in the exercise or performance, or purported exercise or
performance, of any powers or duties at common law or under this or any other Act
or law.
A liability that, but for subs (1), would lie against a police officer, lies against
the Crown.66
Of course, the legal effect of a liability-shifting protection is not to place the
public officer on the same footing as if the Crown were vicariously liable for
his or her conduct at common law. This is because the findin that an
employer is vicariously liable for the conduct of an employee does not, strictly
speaking, defeat the liability of the employee; rather, both parties are classifie
as joint tortfeasors and both are, in theory, liable to contribute to any award in
damages.67 In contrast, a liability shifting protection transfers liability to the
62 See, eg, C Sappideen and P Vines (Eds), Fleming’s the Law of Torts, 10th ed, Lawbook Co,
2011, p 447; H Luntz et al, Torts: Cases and Commentary, 7th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths,
2013, pp 890–5.
63 Dansey v Richardson (1854) 3 El & Bl 144 at 162; approved in Darling Island Stevedoring
and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 at 62 per Kitto J; BC5700280.
64 See, eg, Enever v R (1906) 3 CLR 969 per O’Connor J; BC0600036. But see Oceanic Crest
(1986) 160 CLR 626 at 638; 66 ALR 29 at 34 per Gibbs CJ.
65 Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 at 57 per
Fullager J; BC5700280. See also Commonwealth v Griffıths (2007) 70 NSWLR 268; 245
ALR 172; [2007] NSWCA 370; BC200710981 at [115] per Beazley JA.
66 See also: Police Act 1998 (SA) s 65; Public Sector Act 2009 (SA) s 74; Public Service Act
2008 (Qld) s 26C.
67 See, eg, Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555 at 585; [1957] 1 All
ER 125 at 138 per Lord Morton, at AC 596-7; All ER 145 per Lord Somerville; Broom v
Morgan (1953) 1 QB 597 at 608; [1953] 1 All ER 849 at 854 per Denning LJ; Thompson
v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574 at 580; 141 ALR 1 at 4 per
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Crown and defeats the liability of the employee entirely (provided, of course,
that he or she acted in good faith or in accordance with some other prescribed
exculpatory criterion).
C Liability-preserving protections and the ‘transferred
immunity’ rule
The second rule that might be displaced by a good faith protection is the
‘transferred immunity’ rule. The transferred immunity rule holds that ‘a
person who is vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of another is protected
by any immunity that is available to the actual wrongdoer’.68 This rule would
appear to support the servant’s tort theory because, if a master’s liability were
his or her own, it would (presumably) remain unaffected by any immunity
afforded specificall to a servant.69 As noted in Part II, parliament and the
courts would appear to accept that good faith protections are susceptible to
this rule (that they are ‘immunities’ in the relevant sense), and it is convenient
therefore to describe good faith protections as immunities for the purposes of
this section.
In practice, the application of the transferred immunity rule is likely to turn
on the language of the immunity itself, assuming it is statutory. This is because
the rule extends only to substantive immunities from liability — that is,
immunities that extinguish the plaintiff’s cause of action entirely — as
opposed to procedural immunities from suit (such as spousal immunity),
which merely prevent a plaintiff from pursuing, but which do not extinguish,
his or her cause of action against a defendant.70 This limitation upon the
operation of the transferred immunity rule is logical if one accepts the
servant’s tort theory, as in the absence of any liability on the servant’s behalf
— that liability being negated by a substantive immunity — there can be no
liability to impose upon the master. In contrast, if the immunity is merely a
procedural one the servant’s liability survives — though it is unenforceable by
action71 — and may be transferred strictly to the master.
If the preceding conclusions are correct, then the simplest way to preserve
the Crown’s liability, while protecting the economic interests of public
servants, would be to grant the latter an immunity from suit (as opposed to an
immunity from liability). This might explain the language adopted the
Singaporean Legislature in a number of provisions, including s 54 of the
Brennan CJ, Toohey and Dawson JJ; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law —
Agency Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01.
68 Commonwealth v Griffıths (2007) 70 NSWLR 268; 245 ALR 172; [2007] NSWCA 370;
BC200710981 at [115] per Beazley JA; citing Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage
Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 at 57–8 per Fullagar J; BC5700280; Parker v
Commonwealth (1965) 112 CLR 295 at 301, 303 per Windeyer J; BC6500140. See also
Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21; 181 ALR 263; [2001] HCA 44; BC200104558 at
[37] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ; Majrowski v Guy’s and St
Thomas’ NHS Trust [2007] 1 AC 224; [2006] 4 All ER 395; [2006] 3 WLR 125; [2006]
UKHL 34 at [12]–[15] per Lord Nicholls. Compare Broom v Morgan (1953) 1 QB 597;
[1953] 1 All ER 849.
69 Broom v Morgan, ibid, at QB 609; All ER 854 per Denning LJ.
70 Ibid, QB 609–10; All ER 854–5; Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC
656, 686; [1964] 2 All ER 999 at 1012 per Lord Pearce.
71 Broom v Morgan, ibid.
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CVP Act, outlined above (no ‘suit or other legal proceedings shall lie
personally against’).72 However, this is not the only way in which legislatures
might seek to circumvent the transferred immunity rule. For example, s 5AD
of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) — which might apply to public servants
and private citizens alike — states as follows:
A good samaritan does not incur any personal civil liability in respect of an act or
omission done or made by the good samaritan at the scene of an emergency in good
faith and without recklessness in assisting a person in apparent need of emergency
assistance.
A medically qualifie good samaritan does not incur any personal civil liability for
advice given in good faith and without recklessness about the assistance to be given
to a person in apparent need of emergency assistance.
This section does not affect the vicarious liability of any person for the acts or
omissions or advice of the good samaritan or medically qualifie good samaritan.
The protections afforded to good Samaritans in all other Australian
jurisdictions,73 with the exception of New South Wales,74 are silent as to
whether the protection afforded extends to employers. As such, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the transferred immunity rule survives in these
jurisdictions in such cases, extinguishing entirely a plaintiff’s rights against
good samaritans and their employers (whether or not the Crown).
VI The manner of wrong to which protection extends
Another drafting technique (or mechanism) that parliament might adopt in
order to limit the scope of a good faith (or other similar) protection, is to frame
that protection as applying only to (1) acts done ‘pursuant to’ (or ‘in the
exercise of’, ‘in the discharge of’, and so forth)75 particular statutory
functions, or (2) acts done for the ‘purposes of’ the relevant statute. As
Williams J has explained:
The pattern emerges that there is a distinction between an act which can only
lawfully be done if done pursuant to an expressed power conferred by an Act, and
72 See also National Parks Board Act (Singapore, Cap 198A, 1996 rev ed) s 11; Hazardous
Waste (Control of Export, Import And Transit) Act (Singapore, Cap 122A, 1998 re ed) s 43;
Human Cloning and Other Prohibited Practices Act (Singapore, Cap 131b, rev ed 2004) s 15.
Confusingly, however, these provisions are also described by their respective statutory
heading as affording ‘Protection from personal liability’.
73 See: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 5 (honestly); Personal Injuries (Liability and
Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 8; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 26; Civil Liability Act 1936
(SA) s 74; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 35B; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 31B.
74 Section 3C of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) affirms the transferred immunity rule, and
notionally extends that rule to private employers, by stating that any ‘provision of this Act
that excludes or limits the civil liability of a person for a tort also operates to exclude or limit
the vicarious liability of another person for that tort’. Thus, s 57 of the Civil Liability Act
2002 (NSW) provides a complete protection to good Samaritans and their employers.
Section 39 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), which affords protection to volunteers in
that jurisdiction, was interpreted to similar effect in Goodhue v Volunteer Marine Rescue
Association Incorporated [2015] QDC 29; BC201511309 at [171]–[175].
75 The same effect may be achieved by adopting various other similar phrases. See Webster
v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 at 605; 116 ALR 545 at 550 per Mason CJ, Deane and
Dawson JJ.
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an act done in furtherance of the purposes of the legislation which does not require
the conferral of power in order for it to be done lawfully.76
Again, the nature of the distinction between these phrases has been examined
elsewhere,77 but its importance for public servants cannot be overstated. This
is because, in choosing one or other (or, perhaps, both)78 of these phrases,
parliament indicates the range of acts (and thus the range of torts) to which it
intends the protection in question to extend. The purpose of this part is to
explain why this is so, and to demonstrate the possible implications of this
distinction for public servants.
A Protections that extend to acts done ‘pursuant to’
specific functions
An example of a good faith protection that extends to acts done pursuant to
specifi functions can be seen in s 65 of the Police Act 1990 (SA):
A member of SA Police does not incur any civil or criminal liability for an honest
act or omission in the exercise or discharge, or the purported exercise or discharge,
of a power, function or duty conferred or imposed by or under this Act or any other
Act or law.
Protections such as s 65 are most likely to provide an answer to trespass or —
if an authorised statutory function, power or duty79 is exercised without
reasonable care — negligence.80 This is because, in interpreting the scope of
a statutory protection that affects individual rights, the legislature is taken to
have ‘chosen its words with complete precision, not intending that such [a
protection], granted in the general interest but at the cost of individuals, should
be carried further than a jealous interpretation will allow’.81 This presumption
reflect the general policy of the law, enunciated in Part V above, which is
protective of private rights. Applying this presumption, the courts have (with
rare exception)82 held that the range of acts that may be done wrongfully yet
pursuant to a statute — and thus fall within the scope of the protection
afforded — is ordinarily limited to acts that require some special authority to
perform.83
76 Colbran v Queensland [2007] 2 Qd R 235; [2006] QCA 565; BC200610674 at [10]. See, to
similar effect, the reasons of Jerrard JA at [34], and Philippides J at [55].
77 See Field, above n 3, at 155–8.
78 See, eg, Plant Protection Act 1989 (Qld) s 28 (repealed), interpreted in Colbran v
Queensland [2007] 2 Qd R 235; [2006] QCA 565; BC200610674.
79 It is possible that the scope of an authorised might be interpreted differently depending upon
whether it is expressed as a duty, power or function, respectively, but this possibility is not
explored further here.
80 Field, above n 3, at 157.
81 Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin (1961) 109 CLR 105 at 116 per Kitto J;
BC6100550.
82 See, eg, Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Rowland (1959) 76 WN 538.
83 See, eg, Marriage v East Norfolk Rivers Catchment Board [1949] 2 All ER 1021 at 1025;
[1950] 1 KB 284 at 292 per Tucker LJ, at All ER 1035; KB 309 per Jenkins LJ; Board of
Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin (1961) 109 CLR 105 at 109 per Dixon CJ, at 117 per
Kitto J, at 124 per Taylor J, at 127 per Windeyer J; BC6100550; Puntoriero v Water
Administration Ministerial Corporation (1999) 199 CLR 575; 165 ALR 337; [1999] HCA
45; BC9905662 at [16]–[18] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J, at [34]–[35] per McHugh J.
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Clearly, an act is most likely to require special authority to perform if it is
otherwise trespassory (such as physically restraining a suspect).84 However,
since an act that requires special authority to perform might be performed
without reasonable care (such as spraying water onto private property),85 a
provision such as s 65 might also provide an answer to a claim in negligence.
Importantly, though, provisions framed in this way are highly unlikely to
provide an answer to negligence that occurs in the course of conduct that does
not require special authority to perform, such as driving a fir engine,86
entering into a contract,87 or interfering with property in the course of a
consensual dealing.88
To be clear, this interpretive approach does not mean that an otherwise
wrongful act must actually be authorised to fall within the scope of a
protection such as s 65.89 However, since parliament does not routinely
prescribe all of the functions that a public servant might engage in — and
typically says nothing at all about functions that do not otherwise interfere
with private rights or interests — a provision that extends only to acts done
pursuant to specifi functions will ordinarily only protect a public servant if
(1) the impugned act required special authority to perform and was in fact
directly authorised by the relevant statute,90 albeit not the wrongful mode in
84 Little v Commonwealth (1947) 75 CLR 94; BC4700330.
85 Hamcor Pty Ltd v Queensland [2015] QCA 183 (2 October 2015) [40] (Gotterson JA).
Similar language is adopted by s 43A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW):
(1) This section applies to proceedings for civil liability to which this Part applies to the
extent that the liability is based on a public or other authority’s exercise of, or failure
to exercise, a special statutory power conferred on the authority.
(2) A ‘special statutory power’ is a power: (a) that is conferred by or under a statute, and
(b) that is of a kind that persons generally are not authorised to exercise without
specifi statutory authority.
(3) For the purposes of any such proceedings, any act or omission involving an exercise
of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power does not give rise to civil liability
unless the act or omission was in the circumstances so unreasonable that no authority
having the special statutory power in question could properly consider the act or
omission to be a reasonable exercise of, or failure to exercise, its power.
It would appear that this provision is intended to provide defendant’s with a protection from
liability, as opposed to modifying the elements of liability (breach of duty) (Roads and
Traffıc Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (2009) 77 NSWLR 360; 53 MVR
502; [2009] NSWCA 263; BC200908690 at [359]–[360] per Campbell JA. That being so,
were a specifi good faith protection available to a public servant in the same circumstances
as a protection under s 43A, that public servant could escape liability by demonstrating (1)
that he or she acted in good faith; (2) that he or she did not act unreasonably in the
Wednesbury sense, or both. However, as discussed in Part IV, above, good faith would
ordinarily be easier to prove. The author is grateful to Neil Foster for his advice and
comments on the operation s 43A.
86 Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin (1961) 109 CLR 105 at 110 per Dixon J;
BC6100550.
87 Puntoriero v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation (1999) 199 CLR 575; 165 ALR
337; [1999] HCA 45; BC9905662 at [37] per McHugh J.
88 Colbran v Queensland [2007] 2 Qd R 235; [2006] QCA 565; BC200610674.
89 Little v Commonwealth (1947) 75 CLR 94 at 108, 111 per Dixon J; BC4700330.
90 Clearly, the question of whether an act is directly authorised (and if so whether it is
expressly or impliedly authorised) might also be a matter of construction, to be determined
having regard to (among other things) the object of the legislation in question and the impact
of a given construction on private rights or interests. It is for this reason more likely that a
broad (inclusive) interpretation would be adopted in respect of good faith protections that
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which that act was done; or (2) the impugned act required special authority to
perform and the public servant mistakenly but in good faith believed it to be
so authorised.
Of course, interpretive presumptions only apply when the meaning of a
statutory provision is uncertain. That being so, and although it is not entirely
clear in the authorities,91 it seems axiomatic that when a defendant engages in
an act that, but for its wrongful mode, is expressly authorised by statute, a
protection framed as extending to acts done ‘pursuant to’ that statute will
apply even though that act does not require special authority to perform.92
There is, after all, nothing to prevent parliament from authorising any act that
it wishes,93 and in some instances it may be prudent to expressly authorise an
act (so as to ensure that a public servants are shielded by a good faith
protection) even if — whether by its very nature or fate of circumstance —
that act does not require special authority to perform.94 Thus, for example,
preserve private rights (see Part V above) than it is in respect of good faith protections that
defeat liability entirely. This does not necessarily mean, however, that (in respect of
liability-defeating protections) an act must be specificall designated by a statute to be
authorised. For example, in Hamcor Pty Ltd v Queensland [2016] 1 Qd R 271; [2015] QCA
183; BC201509601 at [45], Gotterson J accepted that, ‘as a principle of statutory
interpretation, a statutory immunity for acts done pursuant to a statute is to be construed as
extending only to acts directly authorised by the statute. However, I would reject, as a
companion proposition, that in order to be directly authorised by a statute, an act must be
specificall listed in it as authorised by it. In my opinion, an act will be directly authorised
by a statute if it falls within a broad description of acts authorised by the statute’. Applying
that reasoning, Gotterson J concluded that the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service was
authorised by s 53(1) of the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 (Qld) to spray water onto a
fire because this was ‘a reasonable measure to protect persons, property or the environment
from danger or potential danger caused by a fir or a hazardous materials emergency’.
91 See, eg, the following statement of Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Australian
National Airlines Commission v Newman (1987) 162 CLR 466; 70 ALR 275; BC8701767,
which would appear to suggest that the presumption applies even if an act is expressly
authorised: ‘Freedom under the common law to engage in conduct requires no grant of
statutory power to confir it, and a limitation provision which affects liability for things
done or purportedly done “under” the statute does not affect liability for things which are
and can be done without reliance on a statutory power to do them’.
92 According to Kitto J, eg, there ‘can be no implication of a grant of power to do, in the
performance of the duty, what is in any case lawful’: Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW)
v Ardouin (1961) 109 CLR 105 at 119; BC6100550 (emphasis added). To similar effect, in
Colbran v Queensland [2007] 2 Qd R 235; [2006] QCA 565; BC200610674 at [35], Jerrard
J explained that the ‘High Court has consistently held for at least the last 50 years against
construing an immunity granted when exercising power to take steps “under” an enactment
to include an immunity for acts or things done or able to be done without any need for the
exercise of a statutory power’ (emphasis added). Note, however, that this does not appear to
be the way in which s 43A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) operates, as in order for
that provision to apply the power wrongly exercised must be (1) conferred by or under a
statute and (2) of a kind that requires special authority to perform.
93 As Barwick CJ has explained, ‘a statute only authorizes those acts which it expressly
nominates and those acts and matters which are necessarily incidental to the acts so
expressly authorized or to their execution’: Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249 at 256;
BC6900610.
94 See, eg, Local Government Act 1995 (WA) s 9.56(3): ‘The protection given by this section
applies even though the thing done in the performance or purported performance of a
function under this Act or under any other written law may have been capable of being done
whether or not this Act or that law had been enacted’. A different conclusion is properly
reached, however, if the function in question is not expressly authorised. See, eg, Colbran
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there would be nothing to prevent parliament from explicitly authorising
‘driving an ambulance’ and affording specifi protection to those who
negligently (but in good faith) perform this function.
The preceding observations may be demonstrated by reference to the
scenario postulated earlier of the Singaporean health inspector (D), who enters
a vessel without the consent of its owner (P).95 Since entering and spraying
pesticide within a vessel without consent are acts that require special authority
to perform — and ‘entering’ and ‘spraying’ are (presumably) for this reason
specificall authorised by ss 21(2) and 35 of the CVP Act — s 54 of that Act
is likely to protect D from liability. That provision, it will be recalled, provides
as follows:
No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Director-General or
authorised officer or any other person acting under the direction of the
Director-General for anything which is in good faith done in the execution or
purported execution of this Act.
Section 54 is likely to protect D from liability because, although she was
negligent in the manner in which she carried out the spraying, she nevertheless
acted in good faith ‘in the execution or purported execution’ of functions
under that Act.96 Suppose, however, that D was invited by P to enter its vessel
to spray a pesticide. Entering and spraying pesticide inside a vessel at the
invitation of its owner are not acts that require special authority to perform.
However, before it would be open to a court to conclude that the protection
afforded by s 54 is unavailable to D on this basis, it would firs need to
conclude that, properly construed, ss 21(2) and 35 do not directly authorise
‘entering’ and ‘spraying’ in general terms — that is, regardless of whether
these acts are done with or without consent. If these provisions are construed
as providing authority to enter a vessel and spray a pesticide irrespective of
any authority provided by the owner of that vessel — and it may well be that
this is what parliament intended — then the protection would presumably still
apply.97
v Queensland [2007] 2 Qd R 235; [2006] QCA 565; BC200610674 at [14] per Williams JA;
at [30] per Jerrard JA; at [58] per Philippides J.
95 See Part IV above.
96 Control of Vectors and Pesticides Act (Singapore, Cap 59, 2002 rev ed) s 54.
97 The description afforded by the court to D’s conduct might also be important and might
differ according to, among other things, the benefi (if any) that D stood to gain from the
impugned activity. For example, if D were to perform the spraying for a fee, it seems likely
(and appropriate) that a court would describe her act narrowly, so that it falls outside the acts
(entering and spraying) authorised by the act. A similar conclusion is likely to be reached if
the Crown retained D’s fee (eg, her act might be described as ‘entering and spraying for a
fee according a commercial arrangement’). On the other hand, if D were to carry out the
spraying gratuitously, in the belief that it was necessary to prevent the release of a vector —
and all the more so if she were instructed to do so by the Crown — it is more likely that a
court would adopt a broad description of her act, which falls within the statutory meaning
of entering and spraying.
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B Protections that extend to acts done for the purposes
of specific functions
What, then, of good faith (and other similar) protections that extend to acts (or,
perhaps omissions) done for the purposes of a statute? An example of such a
protection is provided in s 106 the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA):
(1) A matter or thing done or omitted to be done by—
(a) an agency or the principal officer of an angency; or
(b) a person acting under the direction of an agency or the principal officer of an
agency,
does not subject the principal officer or any person so acting personally to any
action, liability claim or demand so long as the matter or thing was done in good
faith for the purposes of giving effect to this Act.98
Although there is little direct authority on the matter, it would appear that the
range of conduct that might be engaged in for the purposes of a statute is
limited to conduct that does not — but for the wrongful mode of its
performance — require some special authority to perform.99 A provision
framed in this way might therefore apply in precisely those circumstances that
the provisions examined in the preceding section do not (such as driving a fir
engine, entering into a contract, or interfering with property in the course of
a consensual dealing).100
Again, this interpretative approach reflect the presumption in favour of
private rights and interests because protections that extend only to conduct
engaged in for the purposes of a statute are not, in terms, connected to the
performance of functions that require special authority to perform, and which
are therefore specificall authorised by the legislature. A protection that
extends generally to acts done for the purposes of an act contains no language
whatsoever — let alone clear language — to indicate that parliament intends
to authorise otherwise unlawful conduct. It follows that protections framed in
this manner could never defeat liability for tortious conduct that, by its very
nature, involves an interference with private rights or interests (namely
trespass), and that such protections are limited to tortious conduct that does
not, but for its wrongful mode, involve any interference with private rights or
interests (namely negligence).
VII Conclusion
This article has shown that good faith protections play (and have played) an
important role in shaping the boundaries of public sector liability and in
managing the boundaries between private and public interests. It has argued
that the widespread availability of good faith protections is likely to influenc
98 See also, eg, Drug misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) s 36P; Young Offenders Act
1997 (NSW) s 72; Coroners Act 2009 (NSW) s 101O.
99 Colbran v Queensland [2007] 2 Qd R 235; [2006] QCA 565; BC200610674 at [2]–[11] per
Williams J, at [34] per Jerrard JA, at [54] per Philippedes J.
100 See above nn 87–9. Note, however, that protections that extend to acts done ‘for the
purposes of’ a statute are commonly afforded concurrently with protections that extend to
acts done ‘pursuant to’ a statute. See, eg, the protections identifie above n 98. See also the
Plant Protection Act 1989 (Qld) s 28 (repealed), interpreted in Colbran v Queensland, ibid.
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(and to have influenced the course of tort-law litigation, by discouraging
plaintiffs from pursuing protected defendants, encouraging plaintiffs to pursue
alternate defendants, or both. The article has also demonstrated that, despite
the outward similarity of most good faith protections, subtle variations in
parliament’s choice of language can alter significantl (1) the scope of a
specifi good faith protection; and (2) the manner in which that protection
allocates liability, economic risk, or both, between public servants and the
Crown.
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